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STATE V. WORTHEN: DEMONSTRATING UTAH’S NEED FOR AN
EXPANDED, ABSOLUTE VICTIM-COUNSELOR TESTIMONIAL
PRIVILEGE
Barry G. Stratford*
I. INTRODUCTION
Evidentiary privileges have generated disagreement since they were first
recognized in the law.1 These privileges exist to prevent a witness from being
compelled to disclose certain information. Such protections acknowledge that
certain relationships2 or communications3 are so important in society that they
warrant heightened confidentiality. A number of privileges are designed to protect
communications made during professional relationships. These include the
relationship between attorney and client,4 physician and patient,5 psychotherapist
and patient,6 and clergyman and penitent.7 In practice, these privileges require
“some sacrifice of availability of evidence relevant to the administration of
justice.”8 When parties seek communications and records arising from these
relationships, the search for truth must occasionally yield to the protection of
* © 2013 Barry G. Stratford; J.D., University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of Law,
2012; M.P.P., University of Utah, 2009; Law Clerk for the Honorable Carolyn B. McHugh,
Presiding Judge, Utah Court of Appeals, 2012–2013. The author prepared this Article in his
personal capacity and the opinions expressed herein are the author’s own and do not reflect
the views of Judge McHugh, the Utah Court of Appeals, or the State of Utah.
1
Developments in the Law—Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450,
1456–58 (1985).
2
For a utilitarian justification arguing that testimonial privileges are judicial
instruments used to effect important practical social aims, see 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2285, at 527 (John T. McNaughton, rev. ed.
1961). See also Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9–11 (1996) (outlining one justification for
evidentiary privileges in a discussion on the importance of the relationship that exists
between psychotherapists or social workers and their patients).
3
For a nonutilitarian justification for privileges based on the privacy protections they
provide, see Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Testimonial Privileges in Federal Courts: An
Alternative to the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEO. L.J. 61, 86 (1973).
4
Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998) (recognizing attorneyclient privilege as “one of the oldest recognized privileges for confidential
communications”).
5
The Federal Rules of Evidence do not recognize a doctor-patient privilege at the
federal level. However, almost every state has recognized the privilege to some degree
either through statute or case law. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-1-137(4) (LexisNexis
2008) (establishing the Utah physician-patient privilege).
6
Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 9–13.
7
In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 387 (3d Cir. 1990) (recognizing
clergy-communicant privilege).
8
1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 72, at 339 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006).
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individual and societal interests. Such a balance preserves the integrity of these
valued relationships.
In recent decades, one evidentiary privilege has gained increased legal
recognition: the victim-counselor privilege.9 Similar to the protections found under
the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the victim-counselor privilege seeks to
protect communications between victims of crimes—almost exclusively child
abuse and sexual assaults such as rape and incest—and their crisis counselors.10
Unlike the psychotherapist privilege, the victim-counselor privilege is necessary to
protect communications with crisis counselors who may be unlicensed or
volunteers with training requirements much lower than those of licensed
psychotherapists.11
A number of public policy concerns support this privilege, including the
understanding that the confidential communications between victims and their
therapists are critical to effective treatment and recovery.12 Similarly, the victims’
rights movement has made significant progress in gaining legal protections for
victims through federal legislation, state legislation, and state constitutional
amendments.13
Occasionally, a conflict may develop in criminal cases between the victimcounselor privilege and a criminal defendant’s right to due process,14 compulsory
process,15 and confrontation.16 Professor Paul Cassell, a prominent crime victim
scholar, framed this issue by noting, “When defense attorneys obtain ex parte
subpoenas for a victim’s confidential information, they may very well violate the

9

See, e.g., People v. Turner, 109 P.3d 639, 643 (Colo. 2005) (noting justifications for
victim-counselor privilege); Euphemia B. Warren, She’s Gotta Have it Now: A Qualified
Rape Crisis Counselor-Victim Privilege, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 141, 146–48 (1995).
10
For a general discussion regarding the historical development of the victimcounselor privilege, see Anne W. Robinson, Evidentiary Privileges and the Exclusionary
Rule: Dual Justifications for an Absolute Rape Victim Counselor Privilege, 31 NEW ENG. J.
ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 331, 337–41 (2005).
11
See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38-203(3) (LexisNexis 2008).
12
See, e.g., Louis Everstine et al., Privacy and Confidentiality in Psychotherapy, 35
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 828, 836 (1980); Ryan D. Jagim et al., Mental Health Professionals’
Attitudes Toward Confidentiality, Privilege, and Third-Party Disclosure, 9 PROF.
PSYCHOLOGY 458, 459–60 (1978); Anna Y. Joo, Note, Broadening the Scope of
Counselor-Patient Privilege to Protect the Privacy of the Sexual Assault Survivor, 32
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 255, 264 (1995).
13
DOUGLAS E. BELOOF, PAUL G. CASSELL & STEVEN J. TWIST, VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 28–31 (3d ed. 2010).
14
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
15
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Compulsory Process Clause was later made obligatory
on the states by passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S.
14, 17–19 (1967).
16
U.S. CONST. amend VI. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403–06 (1965).
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rights of the victim, such as the right to confidentiality preserved in the doctorpatient privilege or psychotherapist privilege.”17
The United States Supreme Court confronted the convergence of these rights
in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,18 weighing a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights
against a victim’s right to the psychotherapist-patient privilege.19 The success of
the crime victims’ rights movement may create a presumption that there is strong
support for a victim’s confidentiality privilege. However, far from resolving the
conflict of rights, the Court’s less-than-clear analysis has been accorded various
interpretations by state and federal courts.20 Because the conflict between a victim
and a criminal defendant surfaces in a variety of contexts relating to the
evidentiary privileges, the patchwork of approaches provides inconsistent guidance
for how courts should handle a victim’s privileged communications when it is
pitted against the rights of a criminal defendant.21
The Utah Supreme Court recently faced this convergence of rights in State v.
Worthen.22 The court evaluated whether a child victim’s privileged psychological
records should remain confidential despite defendant’s claim that the records were
necessary to his defense.23 While the court indicated that a broader victims’ rights
issue—whether Utah’s victims’ statutory and constitutional protections should
influence a criminal defendant’s ability to overcome a victim’s right to privilege—
was open for judicial review, the court declined to make such a determination
because appellant failed to properly raise it on appeal.24
This case demonstrates the need for the Utah Legislature to act and remove
any doubt that crime victims deserve an expanded, absolute victim-counselor
testimonial privilege. The underlying policy rationales of privileges in general and
concerns about the victims of crime in particular support an absolute privilege.
Victims’ rights recognized by legislation and state constitutional amendments also
call for such a privilege. Lastly, the United States Supreme Court’s recognition that
an individual has a constitutional right to privacy underscores the need to protect
confidential communications made during counseling.25 In short, the rights
17

Paul G. Cassell, Treating Crime Victims Fairly: Integrating Victims into the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 861, 907.
18
480 U.S. 39 (1987).
19
See id. at 56–60.
20
See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 8, § 136, at 569–73; see infra text
accompanying notes 117–157.
21
See, e.g., United States v. Shrader, 716 F. Supp. 2d 464, 470–72 (S.D. W. Va.
2010).
22
222 P.3d 1144 (Utah 2009).
23
Id. at 1147.
24
Id. at 1158.
25
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (reaffirming constitutional
protection for privacy and applying it to private, consensual homosexual sexual activity);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (recognizing “that a right of personal privacy, or a
guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution”);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972) (finding that a law prohibiting the
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afforded to all crime victims should be no less important than the rights afforded to
criminal defendants.
Part II of this Article explores the victim-counselor privilege. This section
identifies the states that recognize the privilege and discusses the three common
versions of the privilege: qualified, semi-absolute, and absolute. Part III explores
the decisions of the United States Supreme Court that address a criminal
defendant’s constitutional rights to access privileged information. This section also
discusses the approaches that other courts, both state and federal, have taken when
addressing the balance between a victim’s privileged, confidential communications
and a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights. Part IV discusses Utah’s statutory
law and case law that underlie victims’ rights to privileged communication. This
section also includes an analysis of the Utah Supreme Court’s recent decision in
State v. Worthen. In Part V, this Article uses State v. Worthen to advocate for an
absolute victim-counselor confidentiality privilege for all crime victims that seek
counseling, not just the traditional protections offered to victims of child abuse and
sexual assault. The underlying public policy interests of privileges in general, the
policy interests regarding victims of crime in particular, and crime victims’
statutory and constitutional rights, all support establishing an absolute victimcounselor testimonial privilege. Part VI concludes.
II. THE VICTIM-COUNSELOR EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGE
Communication between a counselor and the victim of a crime may qualify as
confidential under several evidentiary privileges. For example, the federal
government and all fifty states recognize some iteration of the privilege between
psychotherapists26 and their patients.27 Thus, crime victims who seek counseling
from a psychotherapist can expect that their communications and reports—and
sometimes their doctor’s reports—will remain confidential in certain

distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons impaired the exercise of personal
rights); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (striking down a Connecticut
law prohibiting the use of contraceptives as violating an individual’s right to privacy).
26
Note, however, that state psychotherapist-patient privileges vary from state to state
regarding the exact qualifications required of a psychologist, therapist, counselor, social
worker, or other professional, and which of these professions actually create a privilege.
Compare UTAH R. EVID. 506 (recognizing Utah’s qualified privilege between patients and
mental health therapists such as physicians, psychologists, and clinical or certified social
workers), with UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-38-201 to -204 (LexisNexis 2008) (recognizing
Utah’s absolute victim-counselor privilege between victims and a “sexual assault
counselor” that “has a minimum of [forty] hours of training in counseling and assisting
victims of sexual assault”).
27
See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 12 n.11, 15 (1996) (recognizing a federal
evidentiary privilege between psychotherapists and their patients and listing statutes from
all fifty states and the District of Columbia that recognize the privilege).
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circumstances.28 While the doctor-patient privilege does not exist on the federal
level, most states have adopted some version of this privilege.29 Likewise, this
privilege may protect crime victims in some instances.
As of 2012, forty states have enacted some protections of confidentiality for
communications between victims of sexual assault and their counselors.30 This
privilege mirrors other advancements in the expansion of the rights of rape victims,
such as rape shield laws, which serve to limit the introduction of evidence
regarding a victim’s past sexual conduct, history, or reputation.31
But even in states that have enacted a specific victim-counselor privilege, the
protections vary considerably.32 For example, in some jurisdictions, the victimcounselor privilege encompasses the written records of rape crisis counselors and
centers,33 while other jurisdictions protect oral testimony of victims and their
counselors in addition to written records.34 The broad enactment of these privileges
“demonstrates a recognition by a majority of state legislatures that the sexual
assault counseling relationship services a valuable societal function in helping
victims recover from the traumatic experience of a sexual assault.”35 Nonetheless,
no federal victim-counselor privilege exists, as neither the Supreme Court nor
Congress has formulated this particular privilege.
28

For an exploration of the argument that “[t]hough the [Jaffee] Court purported to
create an absolute privilege, in actuality it recognized a privilege without defining its
contours,” see Molly Rebecca Bryson, Note, Protecting Confidential Communications
Between a Psychotherapist and Patient: Jaffee v. Redmond, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 963,
1004 (1997).
29
See John Jennings, Note, The Physician-Patient Relationship: The Permissibility of
Ex Parte Communications Between Plaintiff’s Treating Physicians and Defense Counsel,
59 MO. L. REV. 441, 451 (1994).
30
Confidentiality Laws, RAPE, ABUSE & INCEST NATIONAL NETWORK,
http://rainn.org/public-policy/laws-in-your-state/ (click on a state; then click on
“Confidentiality Protections” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 25, 2012). The following states
and territories do not have a statutory privilege for communications between a rape
counselor and victims of sexual assault: Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Guam, Idaho,
Maryland, Mississippi, Ohio, Rhode Island, and South Dakota. Id. (citing, e.g., Supreme
Court of Rhode Island Advisory Opinion to the House of Representatives, 469 A.2d 1161
(R.I. 1983) (determining that an absolute privilege protecting communications would be
unconstitutional and that, if enacted, a victim-counselor privilege must include the
possibility of in camera review)).
31
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 412(a) (barring most evidence offered to prove “that any
alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior” or “any alleged victim’s sexual
predisposition”).
32
See Major Paul M. Schimpf, Talk the Talk; Now Walk the Walk: Giving an
Absolute Privilege to Communications Between a Victim and Victim-Advocate in the
Military, 185 MIL. L. REV. 149, 183 (2005).
33
See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-623 (2005).
34
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 90.5035(2) (2000).
35
RAPE, ABUSE & INCEST NATIONAL NETWORK, PRIVILEGE AND CONFIDENTIALITY
BETWEEN SEXUAL ASSAULT VICTIMS AND COUNSELORS 5 (2011).
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The victim-counselor privilege exists within three general categories of
varying force and application: qualified, semi-absolute, or absolute.36 A qualified
privilege typically affords a defendant some opportunity to access the records for
developing a defense.37 Eighteen states and the District of Columbia have a victimcounselor privilege that is qualified by statute.38 This qualified privilege is
accomplished by giving a judge or administrator the discretion to hold an in
camera review of privileged records when a defendant satisfies an initial threshold
of relevance by showing, through a preponderance of the evidence, that the
probative value of the records will outweigh the prejudicial effect on a victim’s
recovery.39 The judge then balances the interests, “reviewing the policy reasons for
the privilege and weighing any harm that the victim may suffer as a result of
revealing information contained in the confidence with any potential probative or
exculpatory value the evidence may contain.”40 The exact procedures vary from
state to state. For example, some states even go so far as to allow for a defense
attorney to access a victim’s records directly.41 As a result, this qualified privilege
may give no actual notice to victims as to whether their communications would be
protected as privileged.
The semi-absolute privilege offers more protections for victims of crime.
While the privilege may seem absolute, court decisions have concluded that an in
camera review or outright waiver of the privileged information may be necessary
when a defendant’s constitutional rights of due process, confrontation, and
compulsory process are implicated. Eight states have a semi-absolute victimcounselor privilege that is, in some manner, qualified by judicial decision.42
The Michigan victim-counselor privilege is one such example.43 The
Michigan statute articulates the privilege as: any “confidential communication, or
any report, working paper, or statement . . . between a victim and a sexual assault
36

See id. at 8–10.
See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 173-C:1–10 (LexisNexis 2001).
38
D.C. CODE §§ 7-1201.01–.04 (LexisNexis 2008); see Confidentiality Laws, supra
note 30. Those states with a privilege qualified by statute include Arizona, California,
Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana (limiting privilege to civil proceedings only pursuant to LA.
CODE EVID. art. 510(b)(1)), Maine, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon (providing no privilege for communications; however,
all information maintained by a sexual assault crisis center or crisis line relating to clients
is confidential pursuant to OR. REV. STAT. § 409.273(2)(b) (2011)), Tennessee, Texas,
Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Confidentiality Laws, supra note 30.
39
See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-C:5. The statute also requires that the
information be unavailable from another source and that nondisclosure would inhibit a
defendant’s right to a fair trial. Id.
40
JESSICA MINDLIN & LIANI JEAN HEH REEVES, THE NAT’L CRIME VICTIM LAW
INST., CONFIDENTIALITY AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVIVORS 14 (2005).
41
See Joo, supra note 12, at 283.
42
See Confidentiality Laws, supra note 30. Those states with a semiabsolute privilege
qualified by judicial decision include Alabama, Alaska, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii,
Massachusetts, Michigan, and Minnesota. Id.
43
MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 600.2157a (LexisNexis 2004).
37

130

UTAH LAW REVIEW ONLAW

[NO. 1

or domestic violence counselor, shall not be admissible as evidence in any civil or
criminal proceeding without the prior written consent of the victim.”44 However,
when interpreting this statute, the Michigan Supreme Court determined that the
privilege must yield to a defendant’s constitutional rights.45 Thus, trial judges are
required to conduct an in camera review of the privileged records once the
defendant has shown a reasonable probability that the records contain information
material to the defendant’s case.46 As a result, a court modifies the absolute nature
of the privilege and, without giving choice to the victim whether to waive the
privilege, the privilege shifts away from the victim entirely to the discretion of the
courts.
Other states provide for an absolute victim-counselor privilege, under which
the victim is the only individual who can decide whether to waive this right.47
Seven states and Puerto Rico have an absolute privilege that is not qualified by
statute or diluted through judicial review.48 These statutes do not contain language
suggesting that judicial review of the confidential communication or records is
necessary or appropriate.49 Because a defendant is “denied access to an entire class
of potentially useful evidence,” these types of absolute privileges are often
challenged as excessively restrictive to a defendant’s constitutional rights.50
III. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT AND JURISDICTIONAL APPROACHES TO THE
CONFLICT BETWEEN THE VICTIM-COUNSELOR PRIVILEGE AND A DEFENDANT’S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
The United States Supreme Court has been unclear regarding the extent to
which a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights must limit evidentiary privileges,
if at all. As a result, while most states afford victims some protections under the
victim-counselor privilege, their force and application vary by jurisdiction. Five
cases provide much of the Court’s analysis in this area: Brady v. Maryland,51
Washington v. Texas,52 Davis v. Alaska,53 United States v. Nixon,54 and
44

Id. § 600.2157a(2).
People v. Stanaway, 521 N.W.2d 557, 575 (Mich. 1994).
46
Id.
47
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107(k)(I) (2011).
48
P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 8, § 652 (2006); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 32 App. 4, Rule 26-A(B)
(2000); see Confidentiality Laws, supra note 30. Those states with an absolute victimcounselor privilege include: Colorado, Indiana, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, South
Carolina, and Vermont. Id. South Carolina’s privilege was established through judicial
decision rather than statute when the South Carolina Supreme Court determined in State v.
Trotter, 473 S.E.2d 452, 454–55 (S.C. 1996), that rape crisis counselor records are not
subject to disclosure under S.C. R. CRIM. P. 5(a)(1)(D).
49
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107(k)(I).
50
RAPE, ABUSE & INCEST NAT’L NETWORK, PRIVILEGE AND CONFIDENTIALITY
BETWEEN SEXUAL ASSAULT VICTIMS AND COUNSELORS 9 (2011).
51
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
52
388 U.S. 14 (1967).
45
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Pennsylvania v. Ritchie. This Article explores the Supreme Court’s approach in
each of these cases. Because the Court’s precedent does not fully provide an
answer to the conflict between victims’ rights and a criminal defendant’s rights,
this Article also explores the approaches that other jurisdictions have used to
address this conflict.
A. Constitutional Limitations on Privilege
Due process, compulsory process, and confrontation issues may create limits
on evidentiary privileges in criminal cases. As an initial matter, defendants have
“no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case.”55 In Brady v.
Maryland, the Court recognized that prosecutors are required to disclose evidence
that is favorable to the accused or material to the accused’s guilt or punishment.56
The Court clarified that this evidence is the kind that would deprive defendants of
their right to a fair trial if not disclosed.57 However, the Court has consistently held
that Brady has limits: “An interpretation of Brady to create a broad,
constitutionally required right of discovery ‘would entirely alter the character and
balance of our present systems of criminal justice.’”58
Crime victims and the counselors holding their records “will only rarely—if
ever—have information a defendant is constitutionally entitled to examine.”59 The
decision in Brady requires only that state actors, namely prosecutors, have a
constitutional duty to turn over exculpatory evidence.60 Because victims and their
counselors are not state actors, they are not subject to Brady restrictions on state
action.61
In United States v. Hatch,62 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals determined
that “a failure to show that the records a defendant seeks are in the government’s
possession is fatal to [a Brady] claim.”63 Other courts have agreed. In State ex rel.
Romley v. Superior Court,64 the Arizona Court of Appeals noted “Brady
emphasizes suppression of evidence by the prosecution, but does not require the
victim to cooperate with the defense [to produce medical records held by the
victim].”65

53

415 U.S. 308 (1974).
418 U.S. 683 (1974).
55
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977).
56
Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
57
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985).
58
Id. at 675 n.7 (citation omitted).
59
Cassell, supra note 17, at 915.
60
See Villasana v. Wilhoit, 368 F.3d 976, 979 (8th Cir. 2004).
61
See Cassell, supra note 17, at 914.
62
162 F.3d 937 (7th Cir. 1998).
63
Id. at 947 (citing United States v. Skorniak, 59 F.3d 750, 755 (8th Cir. 1995)).
64
836 P.2d 445 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
65
Id. at 452.
54
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In the Eighth Circuit, a defendant cannot subpoena medical records of a
witness66 or compel disclosure of witnesses’ medical and psychiatric records where
“the government has no obligation to obtain for a defendant records that it does not
already have in its possession or control.”67 In Goldsmith v. State,68 a Maryland
court likewise found “no common law, court rule, statutory or constitutional
requirement that a defendant be permitted pre-trial discovery of privileged records
held by a third party.”69
In Washington v. Texas, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that a criminal
defendant’s rights under the Compulsory Process Clause apply to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment.70 In doing so, the Court struck down a Texas
statute that designated persons charged or convicted in the same crime as
incompetent to testify on one another’s behalf.71 The Court noted, “Nothing in this
opinion should be construed as disapproving testimonial privileges . . . which are
based on entirely different considerations from those [considered in the current
case].”72
The Court held in Davis v. Alaska that a defendant’s right to cross-examine a
witness under the Confrontation Clause outweighed Alaska’s statutory privilege
for juvenile records.73 The Court found that the Alaskan statute denied the
defendant the opportunity to introduce a witness’s probationary status during
cross-examination.74 “The State’s policy interest in protecting the confidentiality of
a juvenile offender’s record,” the Court said, “cannot require yielding of so vital a
constitutional right as the effective cross-examination for bias of an adverse
witness.”75 The Court did not, however, require disclosure of the record.76 Instead,
it remanded the case with the suggestion that Alaska could protect their witness’s
record “by refraining from using him to make out its case.”77
Lastly, in United States v. Nixon, the Court held that a claim of absolute
privilege between the President and those who advise and assist him would not
prevail “over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair
administration of criminal justice.”78 The Court noted that a “generalized assertion
of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending
criminal trial.”79
66

See Skorniak, 59 F.3d at 755–56.
United States v. Hall, 171 F.3d 1133, 1145 (8th Cir. 1999).
68
651 A.2d 866 (Md. 1995).
69
Id. at 873.
70
388 U.S. 14, 17–19 (1967).
71
Id. at 19–23.
72
Id. at 23 n.21.
73
415 U.S. 308, 319–20 (1974).
74
Id. at 315–18.
75
Id. at 320.
76
Id. at 320–21.
77
Id.
78
418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974).
79
Id.
67
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Together, these cases establish the historical framework for the Court’s
analysis in determining the scope of an evidentiary privilege in the face of a
defendant’s constitutional rights. The convergence of these rights was exactly what
the Court faced in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, where it weighed a criminal
defendant’s constitutional rights against a victim’s rights under Pennsylvania’s
psychotherapist-patient privilege.80
B. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie
In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, the United States Supreme Court balanced a
state’s interests in protecting victims’ privileged communications against a
defendant’s rights.81 Defendant George Ritchie was charged with numerous sexual
offenses for raping his thirteen-year-old daughter.82 The daughter reported the rape
to the police, who referred the matter to Pennsylvania’s Children and Youth
Services agency.83 The defendant subpoenaed the agency during pretrial discovery,
seeking access to the records related to his daughter’s allegations and other records
from a separate investigation stemming from a report by an unidentified source
that claimed the defendant’s children were being abused.84
Asserting privilege under Pennsylvania law, Children and Youth Services
refused to comply with the subpoena.85 The statute required that all reports and
information obtained during the agency’s investigation must be kept confidential,
subject to certain exceptions.86 The defendant argued he was entitled to the
information “because the file might contain the names of favorable witnesses, as
well as other, unspecified exculpatory evidence.”87 The trial judge denied the
defendant’s motion and refused to order Children and Youth Services to disclose
the files.88 The prosecution’s main witness against the defendant was his daughter,
who was cross-examined at length at trial.89 The defendant was ultimately
convicted on all counts and sentenced to three to ten years in prison.90
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that denying access to the
records violated the defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation and
compulsory process.91 The court held that the defendant’s lawyer should have been
permitted to review the files “to search for any useful evidence” from “the eyes

80

480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987).
Id.
82
Id. at 43.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.; 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN., § 6339(a) (West 2010).
87
Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 44.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 44–45.
90
Id. at 45.
91
Id. at 46.
81
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and the perspective of an advocate.”92 Pennsylvania appealed and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari.93
First, a plurality of the Court addressed the defendant’s Confrontation Clause
claim.94 Chief Justice Rehnquist, along with Justices Powell, White, and
O’Connor, disagreed with the defendant that, by being denied access to the
privileged records, his right to cross-examination had been violated.95 The plurality
noted, “The Confrontation Clause provides two types of protections for a criminal
defendant: the right physically to face those who testify against him, and the right
to conduct cross-examination.”96
If the Clause were construed as the defendant had argued, it would “transform
the Confrontation Clause into a constitutionally compelled rule of pretrial
discovery.”97 The right to confrontation “is a trial right, designed to prevent
improper restrictions on the types of questions that defense counsel may ask during
cross-examination.”98 Since the defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine his
daughter, his confrontation right had not been violated.99
In concluding that the Compulsory Process Clause “provides no greater
protections . . . than those afforded by due process,” a majority of the Court
declined to determine how and whether the two clauses differ, and chose instead to
decide the issue under the Due Process clause.100 Justice Blackmun joined the
plurality to find that “the government has the obligation to turn over evidence in its
possession that is both favorable to the accused and material to guilt or
punishment.”101 Thus:
Although we recognize that the public interest in protecting this type of
sensitive information is strong, we do not agree that this interest
necessarily prevents disclosure in all circumstances. This is not a case
where a state statute grants [Children and Youth Services] the absolute
authority to shield its files from all eyes. Rather, the Pennsylvania law
provides that the information shall be disclosed in certain circumstances,
including when [Children and Youth Services] is directed to do so by
court order.102
Where “the Pennsylvania Legislature contemplated some use of [Children and
Youth Services] records in judicial proceedings,” the court reasoned, “we cannot
92

Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
94
Id. at 51–54.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 51.
97
Id. at 52.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 54.
100
Id. at 56.
101
Id. at 57.
102
Id. at 57–58 (citations omitted).
93

2013]

UTAH’S NEED FOR AN ABSOLUTE VICTIM-COUNSELOR PRIVILEGE

135

conclude that the statute prevents all disclosure in criminal prosecutions.”103
Therefore, given the absence of Pennsylvania’s state policy to the contrary, the
Court reasoned that there could not be any belief “that relevant information would
not be disclosed when a court of competent jurisdiction determines that the
information is ‘material’ to the defense of the accused.”104According to the
plurality, the defendant did have a constitutional right to access material
information contained within the agency’s files.105
The defendant himself did not have a right to make determinations as to the
materiality of the information.106 However, the defendant’s rights would be
sufficiently protected through the trial court conducting an in camera review.107
Furthermore, if a defendant is aware of specific information contained within the
privileged material, “he is free to request it directly from the court, and argue in
favor of its materiality.”108
The Court stated that it had “no opinion on whether the result in this case
would have been different if the statute had protected the [Children and Youth
Services] files from disclosure to anyone, including law-enforcement and judicial
personnel.”109 Thus, while the Court suggested that a due process analysis might
apply differently to an absolute privilege, it did not explicitly endorse the idea.110
The total and full disclosure of the confidential information, however, “would
sacrifice unnecessarily” the State’s “compelling interest in protecting its childabuse information.”111
Next, the Court proceeded to outline and recognize some of the justifications
underlying the victim’s privilege. Release of the records, even through defendant’s
counsel, would have “seriously adverse effect[s]” on a state’s efforts to “uncover
and treat abuse.”112 As an example, the Court said that because child victims are
often the only witnesses to the crime and the child may endure overwhelming
“feelings of vulnerability and guilt” when the abuser is a parent, it “is essential that
the child have a state-designated person to whom he may turn, and to do so with
the assurance of confidentiality.”113 Additionally, neighbors and relatives who
suspect abuse may be more likely to report their suspicions if they are assured that
their identities will be protected.114
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The Court even went so far as to applaud Pennsylvania’s efforts to guarantee
a victim’s confidentiality—calling the efforts “commendable.”115 The Court
concluded by noting that this laudable purpose would be undermined, however, if
disclosure of confidential material was required “upon demand to a defendant
charged with criminal child abuse, simply because a trial court may not recognize
exculpatory evidence.”116
The Court’s determination in Ritchie has left unclear how a defendant’s
constitutional rights analysis would apply to an absolute evidentiary privilege. As a
result, many jurisdictions have reached divergent conclusions under nearly
identical fact patterns.
C. Other Jurisdictional Approaches
Several jurisdictions have addressed the conflict between a defendant’s rights
and evidentiary privileges, including the victim-counselor privilege. These
arguments can be recast as “implicating a victim’s federal privacy and due process
rights [creating] a scenario where a constitutional right is being balanced against
another constitutional right.”117 This very concern has caused the victim-counselor
evidentiary privilege to vary in force and applicability from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. The decisions of both state and federal courts are discussed below.
Several state courts have held that an absolute victim-counselor privilege
outweighs a defendant’s constitutional challenge. In Commonwealth v. Wilson,118
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court once again weighed the statutory victimcounselor privilege against a defendant’s Sixth Amendment challenge. This time,
the court upheld the absolute nature of the privilege.119 The court distinguished the
circumstances in Wilson from Ritchie, noting that the privilege at issue in Wilson
had been modified to be an absolute privilege.120 Likewise, in Commonwealth v.
Kennedy,121 a defendant charged with sexually abusing his stepdaughter sought
disclosure of the victim’s psychotherapy records.122 The Pennsylvania Superior
Court found that the Commonwealth’s absolute victim-counselor privilege was not
“subject to balancing against a defendant’s right of confrontation” where “such a
balancing would, in effect, destroy the right which the privilege sought to
protect.”123
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In People v. Turner,124 the Colorado Supreme Court found that Colorado’s
victim-advocate privilege was absolute and could only be waived by the victim.125
In rejecting the defendant’s due process claim, the court relied on the Ritchie
decision and other cases relating to its psychotherapist-patient privilege.126 The
Turner court distinguished Ritchie on the grounds that Colorado’s victimcounselor privilege was absolute.127 In like manner, the New Jersey Superior
Court, in State v. J.G.,128 also distinguished the Ritchie decision and rejected a due
process challenge to New Jersey’s victim-counselor privilege.129 The New Jersey
Superior Court did, however, leave open the possibility that privileged records may
be accessed in certain “compelling circumstances.”130
Many state courts have upheld the privilege, but have alluded to
circumstances under which the privilege would give way to some level of judicial
review. In People v. Foggy,131 the Illinois Supreme Court upheld its victimcounselor privilege in the face of defendant’s vague assertions that counseling
records may possibly contain material information.132 This court recognized that
Ritchie did not resolve “whether an absolute privilege must yield to a criminal
defendant’s pretrial discovery request for otherwise privileged information that
may provide material for use in cross-examining witnesses.”133 The court left open
the consideration that certain circumstances would undercut the absolute nature of
the privilege.134 Likewise, in State v. Pinder,135 a Florida court found that “a
defendant must first establish a reasonable probability that the privileged matters
contain material information necessary to his defense” before an in camera review
would be conducted.136
Other state courts reached the opposite conclusion, determining that when
defendants make a sufficient showing that their constitutional rights may be
harmed, the victim-counselor privilege must yield, regardless of its scope. In
124
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People v. Stanaway,137 the Michigan Supreme Court considered the scope of the
state’s victim-counselor privilege, concluding the right was not absolute.138 The
court found that the “prudent need to resolve doubts in favor of constitutionality”
requires a trial court to conduct an in camera review of privileged information
when a defendant “has a good-faith belief, grounded on some demonstrable fact,
that there is a reasonable probability that the records are likely to contain material
information necessary to the defense.”139 Alabama,140 Connecticut,141 Hawaii,142
Indiana,143 Massachusetts,144 Montana,145 and Rhode Island146 have all advanced
similar arguments that support a judicial in camera review of confidential
communications to weigh the victim’s privacy interests against a defendant’s
constitutional rights.
Federal courts have also reached strikingly divergent results. In United States
v. Shrader,147 a federal district court in West Virginia evaluated the issue, paying
special attention to the considerations of victims’ rights. The court found that “the
psychotherapist-patient privilege is not subordinate to the Sixth Amendment rights
137
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of Defendant” who sought a subpoena to produce the counseling records of the
victim of stalking.148 It recognized that if “victims . . . have to choose whether to
obtain counseling knowing [the defendant] can subpoena the records thereof there
would be no choice at all.”149 Other federal courts have rejected the argument that
privilege is secondary to defendant’s rights,150 even refusing to conduct an in
camera review, finding it “a breach of the privilege.”151
Still, other federal courts have reached the contrary conclusion. In Bassine v.
Hill,152 the district court found the habeas petitioner’s right to cross-examine,
confront, and due process outweighed psychotherapist-patient privilege.153
Likewise, in United States v. Mazzola,154 a district court found the criminal
defendant’s constitutional right to effectively prepare and cross-examine a witness
outweighed societal interests in guarding the confidentiality of communications
between therapist and client.155 In United States v. Hansen,156 the court similarly
found the defendant’s need for privileged information outweighed interests of the
deceased victim and the public in preventing disclosure.157
Due process, compulsory process, and confrontation issues may create limits
on evidentiary privileges in criminal cases. The decision in Brady requires only
that prosecutors or other state actors, not the victims of the crime, have a
constitutional duty to turn over exculpatory evidence. The United States Supreme
Court’s decision in Ritchie has left it unclear to what extent a criminal defendant’s
constitutional rights must limit evidentiary privileges. In addressing these
conflicting rights, state and federal courts have arrived at vastly different results
from similar fact patterns. These antithetical conclusions demonstrate the need to
look to Utah’s case law and underlying statutory provisions to better determine
how Utah should apply its victim-counselor evidentiary privilege.
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IV. STATE V. WORTHEN: DEMONSTRATING UTAH’S NEED FOR AN EXPANDED,
ABSOLUTE VICTIM-COUNSELOR PRIVILEGE
In addition to the privileges promulgated in the Utah Rules of Evidence,158 the
Utah Legislature has established an absolute, though narrow, victim-counselor
privilege by statute. The legislature passed the Confidential Communications for
Sexual Assault Act159 “to enhance and promote the mental, physical and emotional
recovery of victims of sexual assault and to protect the information given by
victims to sexual assault counselors from being disclosed.”160
This privilege is limited to those victims who have “experienced a sexual
assault of whatever nature including incest and rape and requests counseling or
assistance regarding the mental, physical, and emotional consequences of the
sexual assault.”161 Any information that a victim gives to a sexual assault counselor
is deemed confidential, including reports and working papers created in the course
of the relationship.162 A sexual assault counselor is defined as “a person who is
employed by or volunteers at a rape crisis center who has a minimum of [forty]
hours of training in counseling and assisting victims of sexual assault.”163
Generally, the victim is the only one who can permit disclosure. However, if the
victim is a minor, the victim’s counselor may disclose the confidential
communication.164 As none of the disclosure exceptions reference a defendant’s
rights, Utah’s privilege can be categorized as absolute.165
Victims of crimes other than sexual assault do not qualify under this privilege.
Therefore, although a victim may be kidnapped and brutally beaten, if the
defendant does not rape or sexually assault the victim, the victim cannot seek
158
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protection under this privilege. Even where a victim is sexually assaulted but
chooses to seek counseling from someone other than a sexual assault counselor—
such as a family doctor, psychologist, or school counselor—communications with
those counselors also fall beyond this statutorily enabled privilege.166
Utah’s psychotherapist-patient privilege may offer victims some protection.
Communications made between a mental health therapist and a patient or victim
are privileged if made “in confidence . . . for the purpose of diagnosing or treating
the patient.”167 Under Utah law, a mental health therapist is defined as a licensed or
certified “physician, psychologist, clinical or certified social worker, marriage and
family therapist, advanced practice registered nurse designated as a registered
psychiatric mental health nurse specialist, or professional counselor; and . . . is
engaged in the diagnosis or treatment of a mental or emotional condition . . . .”168
While all victims receiving counseling can qualify for protection under Utah’s
psychotherapist-patient privilege, it does not offer the absolute protections
available under the Confidential Communications for Sexual Assault Act.169
Utah’s psychotherapist-patient privilege is not absolute; it does not apply when a
defendant asserts that the privileged communication is relevant to “the physical,
mental, or emotional condition of the patient . . . in any proceeding in which that
condition is an element of any claim or defense.”170 This has created a disparity in
the rights of Utah victims.
A. Utah Case Law Foundations of the Victim-Counselor Privilege
Several cases provide the underlying support and rationale for analyzing a
victim’s privilege in Utah courts. In State v. Cardall,171 Richard Cardall was
charged with raping his girlfriend’s eleven-year-old daughter, S.F.172 Following the
assault, a school counselor administered an anxiety exam on S.F., during which
she became “extremely upset” and began “crying out of control” during school.173
Before trial, defendant requested an in camera review of S.F.’s school
psychological records seeking review of the anxiety exam and information
regarding another allegation the victim made regarding inappropriate touching by a
school janitor.174 The trial court refused, noting that the records were privileged,
and a jury ultimately convicted the defendant.175 Cardall appealed, alleging his due
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process rights were violated for refusal to conduct an in camera review of the
confidential school counseling records.176
The Utah Supreme Court determined that the school counselor records were
protected under the qualified psychotherapist-patient privilege—rather than
absolute victim-counselor privilege.177 Following the analysis of Ritchie, the court
determined that “if a defendant can show with reasonable certainty that
exculpatory evidence exists which would be favorable to his defense,” an in
camera review should be conducted to review the materiality of the evidence.178
The court then examined whether the defendant had made a “general” or
“specific” request for information in the privileged records.179 Rather than relying
on a materiality standard, this “general” and “specific” analysis problematically
“permits a defendant direct access to information he specifically requests and
requires an in camera review for materiality when the defendant makes a general
request for specific materials.”180 Here, the defendant was entitled to review the
records and the court remanded with instructions to determine if the counseling
records contained material information that would have changed the outcome of
the trial.181
Separately, in State v. Blake,182 the court denied defendant access to a victim’s
confidential material for failure to show “with reasonable certainty that
exculpatory evidence exists which would be favorable to [his] defense.”183 There,
the Utah Supreme Court addressed the defendant’s argument that “the pendulum
has swung too far from the historically poor treatment of victims and reached the
other end, treating defendants unjustly.”184 The court then fully explored the
historical treatment that victims of rape have received in the law.185
The court also recognized the expansion of victims’ rights, including the
addition of privilege in rape crisis counseling and Utah’s rape shield law.186 The
court also recognized that the victims’ rights amendment to Utah’s Constitution
“provide[s] useful context for [the court’s] review of past and current treatment of
rape and sexual assault victims.”187 The court was clear, however, that it did “not
decide this case by resorting to Utah’s victims’ rights amendment.”188
176

Id. at 85.
Id.
178
Id.
179
Id. at 86.
180
Tera Jckowski Peterson, Distrust and Discovery: The Impending Debacle in
Discovery of Rape Victims’ Counseling Records in Utah, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 695, 725.
181
Cardall, 982 P.2d at 86.
182
63 P.3d 56 (Utah 2002).
183
Id. at 62 (quoting Cardall, 982 P.2d at 85).
184
Id. at 58–59.
185
Id. at 59–60.
186
Id. (citing UTAH CODE ANN. §§78-3c-1-4 (1996), and UTAH R. EVID. 412
(preventing most uses of evidence of victim’s sexual behavior)).
187
Id. at 60.
188
Id.
177

2013]

UTAH’S NEED FOR AN ABSOLUTE VICTIM-COUNSELOR PRIVILEGE

143

Here, the statutory absolute privilege did not apply because the type of
counseling the victim received was different from the “rape-crisis” counseling
under Utah’s victim-counselor privilege.189 Thus, the court clarified the standard
discussed in Cardall.190 Because the psychotherapist privilege is not absolute,
certain circumstances exist where “a crime victim and her therapist might be
subject to in camera review and disclosure.”191
For example, the privilege might be limited if the defendant can show “with
reasonable certainty that exculpatory evidence exists which would be favorable to
[the] defense.”192 After an in camera review, the trial judge will find evidence
material where “there is a reasonable probability that, if the evidence is disclosed
to the defense, the result of the proceeding will be different.”193
In State v. Gomez,194 the Utah Supreme Court determined whether the
defendant had a right to a victim’s records from a rape crisis center.195 Though the
defendant argued that due process required disclosure of the records, the court held
that Ritchie was not controlling where the victim-counselor privilege as implicated
here, rather than the psychotherapist-patient privilege, affords an absolute
privilege.196 Because the defendant did not adequately brief these constitutional
arguments, however, the Utah Supreme Court did not address these claims
further.197
The Utah Supreme Court has still not reached the issue of whether an absolute
privilege must yield to a defendant’s constitutional rights. As the court’s decisions
illustrate, the scope and breadth of Utah’s victim-counselor privilege begs for
additional analysis in the face of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment claims.
B. The Utah Case: State v. Worthen
In July of 2005, Mr. and Mrs. Worthen’s adopted thirteen-year-old daughter,
B.W., “attempted suicide and was admitted to the inpatient program at the
University of Utah Neuropsychiatric Institute.”198 After weeks of counseling and
therapy, B.W. was released into her parents’ care and “began outpatient counseling
with Dr. Carolyn Henry . . . . During this time, B.W. kept a journal in which she
expressed her . . . general hatred of her adoptive parents and her desire to be with a
new family.”199
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In October of 2005, B.W. told Dr. Henry that her adoptive father “had
repeatedly sexually abused her.”200 In turn, Dr. Henry “reported the allegation to
authorities” as required by Utah law.201 As a result of these allegations, the state
charged Mr. Worthen with ten counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child.202
Mr. Worthen filed a motion seeking an in camera review of B.W.’s medical
and therapy records from July through October of 2005.203 Specifically, Mr.
Worthen sought review to search for “B.W.’s denial of abuse by Mr. Worthen, . . .
‘cognitive problems and major misinterpretation problems,’ and . . . a motive to
fabricate the allegations stemming from her hatred of her parents.”204
Conceding that the records were within Utah’s doctor-patient privilege and
psychotherapist-patient privilege, Mr. Worthen argued that the records fell under
an exception to these evidentiary privileges.205 Under the Utah Rules of Evidence,
a communication is exempt from the psychotherapist privilege if it is “relevant to
an issue of the physical, mental, or emotional condition of the patient in any
proceeding in which that condition is an element of any claim or defense.”206
The trial court ruled in favor of Mr. Worthen.207 After the State petitioned for
interlocutory review, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s order
granting in camera review.208 The State and the Office of Guardian ad Litem—
appointed to represent B.W.’s interest—successfully petitioned the Utah Supreme
Court for review.209
One question certified for review, among others, was “whether the court of
appeals erred by failing to consider constitutional and statutory provisions relating
to a victim’s rights.”210 The Utah Crime Victims Legal Clinic, in conjunction with
the National Crime Victim Law Institute, filed an amicus brief addressing this
issue. They argued that the court of appeals had erred in affirming the trial court
because it had failed to “meet its general obligation to ensure the fair
administration of justice and its specific obligations to victims under state law.”211
Furthermore, the amicus curiae argued that a victim has a constitutional right
to fair and sensitive treatment, that the vigorous protection of the victim’s rights
were violated, and that any properly raised issue of victims’ rights must be
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considered on appeal.212 These rights, the amici argued, were particularly
important given the “extra consideration for her interests as a child.”213 Most
notably, however, the amici highlighted the fact that “[t]his case brings into stark
relief the need for courts to explicitly consider the independent constitutional and
statutory rights of crime victims when ruling on requests for their privileged
counseling records.”214
The Utah Supreme Court, however, did not share this view. While the court
recognized that the court of appeals did not address the relevance of the Utah
Constitution’s victims’ rights amendment or state victims’ rights statutes to a trial
court’s examination of these evidentiary decisions, it held the failure to address
was not erroneous.215 The court reasoned that these issues had not been properly
presented on appeal, and therefore need not be addressed because the trial court did
not make an adverse ruling on victims’ rights grounds.216 The court found the
reliance on Utah’s Rights of Crime Victims Act217 as grounds for appellate court
review of any victims’ rights issue was misplaced.218 The court also noted that it
could not decide the issue, as it had not been properly preserved.219
But even though the court declined to rule on the crime victims’ issue, it
hinted that victims’ rights “support considerable policy-based arguments”
justifying a victim’s evidentiary privilege.220 Perhaps forecasting future decisions,
the Utah Supreme Court further referenced its decisions in State v. Gonzales221 and
State v. Blake as possible underlying support for an increased deference to
victims’ rights.
The court also upheld the “reasonable certainty test,” which requires only that
a defendant establish that records exist and show with reasonable certainty—that
is, “more likely than not”222—that the records may have exculpatory evidence
favorable to his defense.223 Once proven, the records are subject to judicial in
camera review.224 The defense will obtain access to the records if there is a
212
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“reasonable probability that, if the evidence is disclosed to the defense, the result
of the proceeding will be different.”225
As many states have done, the Utah Legislature provided some limited
groundwork for a victim-counselor privilege. Utah’s case law also recognizes the
absolute nature of Utah’s limited privilege between crime victims and rape-crisis
counselors in addition to the underlying policy reasons supporting this evidentiary
privilege.
As Worthen demonstrates, there is still need for states to refine their privilege
by expanding its scope. State legislatures, including the Utah Legislature, should
recognize the legitimate interests underlying an absolute, expanded privilege, the
constitutional and statutory protections offered to all crime victims, and the
constitutional rights of privacy.
V. PUBLIC POLICY, VICTIMS’ RIGHTS, AND PRIVACY INTERESTS SUPPORT AN
ABSOLUTE VICTIM-COUNSELOR EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGE
The argument that the victim-counselor privilege is applicable only when a
criminal defendant’s constitutional rights are not implicated is perverse. Holding
this privilege as secondary to the Sixth Amendment is contrary to other similar
privileges—if not, would not the attorney-client privilege often yield to a criminal
defendant’s cross-examination needs? Exceptions to the victim-counselor
privilege, even in the Sixth Amendment context, would “eviscerate the
effectiveness of the privilege.”226
The justifications for the victim-counselor privilege mirror the rationales for
the psychotherapist-patient privilege. All relationship-oriented evidentiary
privileges, including the victim-counselor privilege, are “rooted in the imperative
need for confidence and trust.”227 Courts have also recognized the importance that
these confidential communications have on the effectiveness of counseling.228 In
addition to the policy considerations supporting privileges in general, state
constitutional amendments229 and state and federal legislation granting rights to
crime victims also support an absolute victim-counselor privilege. Lastly,
constitutional privacy rights help ensure the confidentiality of victims’
communications and records made during counseling. State legislatures should
guarantee, and state supreme courts should likewise recognize, that all crime
victims have an absolute right to communicate confidentially with their counselors
during the course of their treatment.
225
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A. States’ Compelling Interests in an Absolute Victim-Counselor Privilege
There are considerable policy interests for adopting an absolute victimcounselor testimonial privilege for the victim of any crime, beyond the traditional
protections offered to child abuse and sexual assault victims, who seeks counseling
as a result of their injury. As the Pennsylvania Superior Court so aptly noted, even
the balancing of a privilege against a defendant’s rights “would, in effect, destroy
the right which the privilege sought to protect.”230
The underlying policy rationales for the victim-counselor privilege are largely
an extension of rationales offered for the well-established psychotherapist-patient
privilege, as recognized by many courts. In Albuquerque Rape Crisis Center v.
Blackmer,231 the New Mexico Supreme Court noted, “The rationales underlying
the statutory victim-counselor privilege echo those underlying the psychotherapistpatient privilege.”232 Likewise, in United States v. Lowe,233 a federal district court
analyzed Massachusetts’s victim-counselor privilege as an expansion of the
psychotherapist privilege.234
This argument is often couched in terms of economic ability, with the victimcounselor privilege providing an extension of the psychotherapist-patient privilege
to nonlicensed social workers that provide for victims who cannot otherwise afford
the services of a licensed psychotherapist.235 For example, victims may receive
counseling from social workers employed at free or low cost rape crisis centers or
domestic violence shelters.236
Although these service centers are often publicly funded, they typically do not
require personnel to undergo the same professional licensing or credentialing as
traditional psychotherapists.237 As one court noted, “It would make little sense for
victims of rape to be deprived of the privilege because they seek help from victim
counselors at a rape crisis center, while victims with the resources to seek help
from a licensed psychologist would benefit from the privilege.”238
Utah courts have found that privileges are designed to encourage “a full and
complete disclosure . . . in order to receive effective medical treatment.”239 When
discussing the federal psychotherapist-patient privilege, the United States Supreme
Court noted that successful psychological treatment
230
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depends upon an atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the patient
is willing to make a frank and complete disclosure of facts, emotions,
memories, and fears. Because of the sensitive nature of the problems for
which individuals consult psychotherapists, disclosure of confidential
communications made during counseling sessions may cause
embarrassment or disgrace. For this reason, the mere possibility of
disclosure may impede development of the confidential relationship
necessary for successful treatment.240
Likewise, other courts have recognized the adverse effects that disclosing a
patient’s communications has on the patient’s recovery. In Kalenevitch v.
Finger,241 the court noted, “Patient confidence is essential for effective
treatment.”242 Additionally, “because the information revealed by the patient is
extremely personal, the threat of disclosure to outsiders may cause the patient to
hesitate or even refrain from seeking treatment.”243 Therefore, “without the
confidentiality which the privilege provides, many people would simply forego
therapeutic treatment.”244
The victim-counselor privilege, for example, would help remedy the “extreme
underreporting” of rape.245 Sexual assault victims often suffer a wide range of
emotional and psychological trauma.246 As one court recognized, victims of sexual
assault and rape suffer a degree of trauma “far beyond that experienced by victims
of other crimes.”247 Crisis centers assist individuals in recovery by providing crisis
intervention services, initial and follow-up counseling, and medical and legal
advice.248
Proponents of the privilege argue, “Without assurances of confidentiality,
sexual assault and domestic violence victims will be reluctant to contact rape crisis
centers and battered women’s shelters.”249 Without the counseling services these
centers provide, such victims “may be hesitant to report crimes and aid in their
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prosecution. The effects will likely be felt by the victim’s children, resulting in a
cycle of abuse that will harm society for decades to come.”250
As the Utah Supreme Court recognized in Blake, there are strong policy
considerations that lend support to an absolute victim-counselor privilege.251 An
absolute privilege seeks to prevent “victims from being needlessly embarrassed or
harassed during the trial process.”252 This includes the prohibition of introducing
evidence about the victim that shifts attention “of a criminal trial from an inquiry
into the conduct of the offender to that of the moral worth of the complainant.”253
As one scholar noted specific to the sexual assault context, “Allowing defendants
to use a victim’s psychiatric history when they are unable to use her sexual history
will ensure that rape victims continue to possess ‘a significantly higher chance than
did victims of any other major felony of seeing their accusations deemed
unfounded.’”254
Notably in Worthen, if the victim had gone to a domestic abuse shelter and
sought counseling from someone who was arguably less qualified than a licensed
psychotherapist, she would have come under the protections of Utah’s victimcounselor privilege. This would have qualified the victim for an absolute privilege
and, under current law, would have precluded Mr. Worthen from accessing the
victim’s confidential records.
The absurdity that victims of the same crime could receive full confidential
protection under one privilege and be exposed under another privilege by ignoring
victims’ statutory and constitutional rights underscores the need for Utah to
address the scope and extent of a victim’s right to confidential communication.
Additionally, though crimes of sexual assault, child abuse, and rape are
particularly heinous, if the results of an assault, an attempted murder, or other
crimes are so serious as to result in the need for a victim’s counseling, much of the
same logic that supports the rape-counselor privilege applies equally to these other
crimes.
If fully adopted in practice, an absolute victim-counselor privilege still
protects a defendant’s rights. Defendants maintain the ability both to crossexamine and introduce other witnesses to impeach credibility.255 This right “does
not include the power to require the pretrial disclosure of” counseling records
merely because the records “might be useful in contradicting unfavorable
testimony.”256
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Defendants retain the ability to confront the victim at trial, and that is
sufficient under the Confrontation Clause.257 Furthermore, “[h]ow a victim
emotionally responds to traumatic experience has no bearing on whether a [crime]
occurred or whether the defendant was the [criminal]. The defendant’s [S]ixth
[A]mendment rights are not diminished by limiting his subpoena power.”258 And
even if there were relevant information protected by the privilege, “[t]he small
amount of relevant information the [crime] victim might convey to the [therapist]
is almost certainly obtainable from other sources and, in any event, would be
highly prejudicial.”259
B. Victims Have (Constitutional) Rights Too
Beyond the state’s compelling policy considerations for evidentiary privileges
and the protections for defendants, Utah courts should consider the rights that
victims have under broader state constitutional amendments and crime victims’
rights legislation. As an initial matter, crime victims’ rights should be viewed
together with or against a defendant’s constitutional rights to seek the information,
not subordinate to them.
As an example of the more broad victims’ rights legislation, Congress enacted
the Crime Victims Rights Act of 2004.260 This legislation codified protections for
victims’ rights in federal prosecutions.261 It mandates that victims be “reasonably
protected from the accused,”262 and treated with “fairness and with respect for the
victim’s dignity and privacy.”263 Thirty-two states have added some form of crime
victims’ rights to their state constitutions.264
These constitutional rights can be classified as providing either broad or
specific rights and protections.265 The more broadly defined rights include
“victims’ rights to fairness, respect, dignity, privacy, freedom from abuse, due
process and [a right to] reasonable protection.”266 The more specific rights exist in
257
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the areas of due process, protection, and privacy.267 For example, a crime victim’s
due process rights may require notice and the opportunity to be heard when
privileged records are to be subjected to a subpoena. When the government’s
decision deprives “property” or “liberty” interests, the “‘[p]arties whose rights are
to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right
they must first be notified’ . . . ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner.’”268
The Utah Legislature intended “to ensure that all victims and witnesses of
crime are treated with dignity, respect, courtesy, and sensitivity, and that the rights
[of victims] . . . are honored and protected by law in a manner no less vigorous
than protections afforded criminal defendants.”269 Accordingly, courts may not,
“in the administration of criminal justice . . . ignore the concerns of victims.”270
The Utah Supreme Court recognized this principle, noting that “prosecutors must
defend and uphold the State’s interest in procuring justice, [and] they have an
obligation to ensure that the constitutional rights of crime victims are honored and
protected.”271
Crime victims deserve fairness, respect, dignity, due process, and freedom
from abuse.272 Unnecessary exposure of a victim’s private communications made
during the course of treatment allows the defendant to further victimize the injured
party, this time with the tacit approval of the criminal justice system. Equal
consideration should be given to victims’ constitutional rights. Allowing a
defendant to access victims’ counseling records “would only open the door to
further victimization.”273 The United States Supreme Court has recognized that
disclosure of confidential communications “may cause embarrassment or
disgrace.”274 Courts in Utah have found that privileges are designed to encourage
“a full and complete disclosure . . . free from the embarrassment [of
disclosure].”275 This revictimization is an injury to the victims, impermissible
under Utah’s Rights of Crime Victims Act.276 Many other states have similar
provisions.277
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Forced disclosure of privileged records and conversations violates a victim’s
right to be treated with dignity, respect, courtesy, and sensitivity. Attempts to shift
attention from the conduct of the defendant to the moral worth of the victim should
not be permissible under any circumstance. Requiring victims to relive the crime
by disclosing the records and communications of their counseling where a
defendant makes only the low requisite showing of reasonable evidence, and even
a less intrusive in camera review at trial, cuts against these considerations.
The ability to obtain records through the use of a reasonable certainty test, as
used in Utah and other jurisdictions, fails to adequately incorporate the
constitutional interests of an individual victim in its analysis. This test only gives
an interest to the victim after granting a defendant the primary interest in showing,
with a reasonable degree of certainty, that the records may be exculpatory.278
The forced disclosure of privileged records and conversations violates a
victim’s right to be treated with dignity, respect, courtesy, and sensitivity. This
revictimization is an injury to the victim and is impermissible under Utah’s Rights
of Crime Victims Act.
C. Constitutional Privacy Interests
Constitutional privacy interests are also a consideration in the victimcounselor confidentiality privilege. Six states have chosen to amend their
constitutions to expressly grant crime victims the right to privacy.279 The United
States Supreme Court has recognized that the federal Constitution ensures an
individual’s right to privacy.280 Other courts have recognized an individual’s
privacy right in a variety of contexts related to counseling and mental health
treatment. For example, in N.O. v. Callahan,281 a district court identified privacy
interests in the treatment and care of mentally ill patients.282
278
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Not only are the communications and records themselves recognized within
this privacy right, a victim also has privacy interests in “avoiding disclosure of
personal matters.”283 Many crime victims’ statutes and state constitutional
amendments endow victims with a right to privacy.284 For example, Utah has
recognized “the general proposition that there is and should be such a [privacy]
right which protects against any wrongful or unseemly intrusion into what should
properly be regarded as one’s personal affairs.”285 Moreover, Utah courts have
recognized that a right to privacy protects a victim’s medical records.286
This liberty interest, recognized in both federal and state constitutional
guarantees of a right to privacy, must weigh against the unwanted mandatory
disclosure of therapy records. If defendants can request a victim’s mental health or
psychological records, the victim’s “constitutional privacy right . . . would be
gutted.”287 At least one scholar has argued that where the privilege is based on
victims’ constitutional privacy rights, it is “less vulnerable to [S]ixth [A]mendment
challenges than a similar statutory privilege.”288
VI. UTAH SHOULD RECOGNIZE A VICTIM’S RIGHT
TO CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS
While victims’ rights have made considerable advances in recent decades,
challenges still exist before a crime victim is fully respected within the criminal
justice system. The victim-counselor privilege, however, is one area where
victims’ rights must improve. This privilege is necessary to protect
communications and records between the victims of crimes and their crisis
counselors and therapists.
A criminal defendant’s right to due process, compulsory process, and
confrontation are, at times, in conflict with this privilege. Federal courts have
failed to address the issue and provide uniformity, as the United States Supreme
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Court’s controlling decision in Ritchie leaves the scope of the privilege vague.
Additionally, at the state level, a patchwork of approaches exists addressing
victims’ confidential communications, ranging from states offering no protections
at all, to states providing an absolute privilege. The Utah Supreme Court recently
faced this issue in State v. Worthen. Although the court declined to rule on the
issue, it hinted that the ultimate determination of whether Utah’s victims’ rights
protections should outweigh a criminal defendant’s rights was ripe for judicial
review.
The Utah example provides a powerful illustration of the need for an
expanded privilege. The Utah Legislature should broaden the privilege in Utah’s
Confidential Communications for Sexual Assault Act. This change would ensure
that the victims of crimes, especially child abuse and sexual assault, are given the
absolute protections the Utah Legislature intended to give them, regardless of their
circumstantial or economic ability to acquire treatment. While Utah recognizes the
need to protect victims of sexual assault and child abuse, victims of other crimes
that seek treatment by mental health professionals or therapists warrant similar
protections, regardless of the perceived heinousness of the crime they endured.
The privilege should encompass any crime victim’s confidential
communications made during treatment with any counselor—whether it is a mental
health professional, psychotherapist, social worker, or a rape crisis counselor. As
one scholar warned, “[W]ithout a bright-line rule barring admissibility of these
records, victims’ rights will not exist in practice.”289 Thus, “[a]n absolute bar
against admitting this evidence . . . establishes a clear rule that protects all
victims.”290
Considerable policy reasons exist supporting victims’ rights to confidential
communications. The underlying policy rationales of privileges generally—and the
rationales for the victims of crimes specifically—combined with broader victims’
statutory rights, constitutional rights, and constitutional privacy interests, all
provide substantial justification for adopting an absolute victims’ privilege. While
the rights granted to victims may vary from state to state, a state’s policy interests
in privileges and underlying statutory and constitutional victims’ rights all support
an absolute victim-counselor privilege. These victims’ rights should be viewed
together with or against a defendant’s constitutional rights, not subordinate to
them. In states where the court has, through judicial fiat, limited an absolute
privilege, state legislatures should move to expand a victim’s protections wherever
possible, whether it is done through legislation or constitutional amendment.
While this expansion of the victim-counselor privilege may not answer all
problems associated with a crime victim’s privilege, it would be an encouraging
and principled step in protecting crime victims from revictimization in our judicial
system and recognizing a victim’s constitutional rights. Utahans deserve a
privilege that guarantees victims of crime are treated with dignity, respect,
courtesy, and sensitivity and finally ensures that crime victims are honored and
289
290
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protected by law in a manner no less vigorous than the protections afforded to
criminal defendants.

